《Thinking Fast and Slow》是一本由Daniel Kahneman著作，LANE ALLEN出版的Hardcover图书，本书定价：288.00元，页数：512，特精心从网络上整理的一些读者的读后感，希望对大家能有帮助。

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(一)：先简单写几笔

　　响应Scott Adams的号召：每个人都应学点心理学。

　　由于相对专业，读起来有点费劲，没有读小说或故事那么轻松。拖了一个多月，终于读完了。

　　这应该是我读的第二本心理学相关的书。如果The Flip Side算作第一本的话。但相比之下，这第二本书的难度更大。单词没多少，心理学名词和心理学现象很多，只读一遍真心记不住多少。需要返工再读，因为里面有很多东西对自己生活很有帮助，对人类和社会的认识也是很有启发的。

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(二)：读了以后上学时学数学犯的错误就释然了

　　读了以后上学时学数学犯的错误就释然了，还专门做了chapter 16 cab expriments的贝叶斯推断：http://lxbdassio.tumblr.com/post/107788679589/thinking-fast-and-slow-cab-experiment 复习了一下高中数学

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(三)：为什么创新是落后者的权利？

　　之前读《策略思维》的时候，看见一个这样的故事，说是有个帆船比赛，A船领先，B船落后，这个时候，B船做了一个冒险的行为，而A船觉得自己占据很好的领先地位，没有办法冒险，还是坚持了自己原先的策略，最后的结局是B船胜出。按照策略的分析，A船在领先的时候，应该跟随B船的策略，因为不管B船正确与否，A船都不会输掉比赛。

　　读完本书以后，也许可以这样重新看待这个故事，作为B船，已经落后了，所以采取take risk的策略，而作为A船，也许是对自己的技艺太自信，也许是害怕风险，所以选择了risk averse，导致最后的失败。

　　书中举了个二选一的例子：

　　A．95%的概率损失1000元，5%的概率什么也不损失

　　．肯定损失900元

　　此例中，A的数学期望是-950元，但仍然有很多人愿意选A搏一把。

　　对于广大创业者，为什么要创新？为什么要做不一样的东西，而不是市场上证明已经可以大卖的东西，也许也是同样的道理。因为作为一无所有的后来者，只有选择冒险，才有可能翻本。

　　每个人对每本书的体会会不一样，这本书对于我来说，有一些是以前注意到，但是没有总结过的东西；有一些是以前没发现的心理现象；还有一些是以前以为知道就能克服的心理现象，现在发现有些心理现象即使你知道是误区也很难克服……

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(四)：管窥之见

　　这本书的定位有些尴尬。有一定心理学背景的读者看不出什么新东西，缺乏背景的读者看起来不轻松。语言与文体的编织也介于大众传媒和严肃科学著作，在可读性与严谨之间权衡。

　　两系统分类本来是为了方便理解的认知过程的理论虚拟，但整合的并不好，各个章节的内容之间有很多独立性，有时能看出来是要把本来挺完善的东西用系统一二这套说辞来“套”一下。书里的内容有些是矛盾的。比如展望理论和启发式理论分别代表两类不同的决策模型，前者和伯努利的期望效用家族是一起的，后者属于司马贺的有限理性家族。但作为介绍来说都非常好，而且难得的严谨。这点难能可贵。心理学是个容易出神棍的学科，读者区分不出理论和修辞不是错，作者有意识的混淆两者才有问题。所以我认为《快与慢》里大量的实验细节不是败笔，而是尤其精华之处。如同书里写的：重要的不是结果怎么样，重要的是结果怎么来的。 系统1系统2本来就是一种比喻修辞而已，从这个角度来说，标题写的倒不是书里最重要的东西。

　　书里写的东西也不是全无争议，毕竟科学一直在进步变化。至于道德伦理问题更麻烦，因为都是真实的两难。用韩乾的话说，电车难题是个真正的伦理难题。小看这些抉择的分量是不对的。

　　我猜卡尼曼的意思不是让我们瞧不起自己与生俱来的进化工具包，而是认识到其局限性。知其所能为、所不能为。再者，看了这么多人类认知决策的一般特点，我们的第一直觉经常是“说的不是我”。假如就这么得意的接受了这个结论，书就算白看了。

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(五)：一点干货

　　被Decisive的两位作者骗来看这本书，快速浏览后的结论是：其实你们是意欲衬托自己作品的实用性吧。此书为理论性书籍，包含各种例证，实验和心理测试，挑出一些干货来：

　　冷温热三杯水原理：分别把两只手放入冷水和热水中，然后同时放入温水中，左右手冷热感不同，虽然是放入同样温度的温水中。这就是参考值reference point的作用。类比到经济学: Outcomes that are better than reference points are gains. Below the reference points they are losses. Bernoulli和Fechnsr认为在确定值和预期平均值相等的情况下由于对数函数的关系，所以100%确定收益对应的心理值比预期可能收益的心理值大，表明人们不愿意冒险。

　　此理论有缺陷，问题在于没有考虑reference point以及人们喜欢gains讨厌losses的本性，据作者说这个理论是从人类进化学中得出来，人有保持现状的本能，特别在面对可能的危险或损失时。所以在保证是gains的情况下，大部分人选择可能性较大的较小预计收益选项；在注定losses的状态下，宁可尝试冒险，选择可能性较小的预计损失较大选项，因为人们害怕损失和失败。

　　如何更好地增加幸福感：效果较持久但愉悦感温和与效果短暂但愉悦感强烈中一般选择前者。若是忍受痛苦方面，颠倒一下。原因：人们的记忆力没有想象中的长久，幸福和痛苦感都容易忘记。但如果差异大到一定程度，此理论就不适用了，并且分界线因人而异。

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(六)：学着慢思考

　　第一次阅读完英文大部头，而且是一本心理学家写作的行为经济学作品。

　　我们每个人都认识自己吗？潜意识、思维误区是如何掌管我们的思考和行为的。丹尼尔形象地假想了存在我们头脑中的系统1和系统2。系统1根据过往经验来做出判断，是无意识的、消耗脑力少的、也是随叫随到的，生活中的下意识举动都是系统1在参与；系统2当系统1遇到麻烦时才会出面解决，它需要专注、消耗脑力，通常是依据系统1的印象做出选择。系统1必不可少，以很少的脑力即完成了日常的行为和生活，但是也会产生一系列思维的谬误。

　　如典型性偏好--容易忽视基础概率；

　　因果性解释--人的大脑倾向于用因果关系来解释事情，人们更愿意相信自己针对果给出因的解释，而不是相信基础概率；

　　光环效应：我们会受到与结论无关而与事件有联系的其他事物的干扰；

　　锚定效应：人们的判断会受到一个参考值的影响，不管这个参考值与事件有关还是无关；

　　框架效应：对一个事物的不同表述方式会让我们有不同的感受，比如三个月后存活率是90% 和三个月后会有10%的病人死亡；

　　可得性偏好：容易出现在大脑中的事物被我们认为发生频率更高；人们会给自己有直观感受的部分更高的权重；

　　禀赋效应：人们会高估自己已经获得的物品的价值（损失厌恶）；

　　峰终效应：人们对一段经历的记忆主要取决于体验时的峰值强度和体验结束时的强度。

　　知道自己人性里的弱点，我们又能做什么呢。

　　知道系统2需要意志力维持，知道意志力有限，在做一件需要强意志力的事情之前，就不要消耗意志力在其他事情上。

　　知道大脑中的联系激活机制，就只是做出笑一笑的动作心情也会变好，不管我们的感觉，至少我们可以表现得热情又友好。想让行为表现得富有青春活力，那我们可以让大脑和“青春、活力、蓬勃”这样的词联系起来，我们的行为会不自觉地靠近。

　　知道清晰的表述会让人认知轻松，熟悉和重复难以区分，那么为了让别人更加相信我们的话，我们可以采取放大字号、提高纸张和字的对比度，使用简短容易发音的句子。反过来，我们也能更加明辨是非，这件事到底是在逻辑上可信，还是他们想让我们相信。保持怀疑很重要。

　　我们知道大样本比小样本更精确，就知道了也许你身边的几个案例反映不了真实情况。

　　我们容易受到锚定效应的影响，就知道商场商品的标价，“限购12件”这些标语是想提供给我们一个基准值；会反思我们做出的判断是不是无意识中受到了不相干的干扰；从高速上下来，也要注意自己是否受到之前较高速度的影响而超速。

　　我们都受到可得性偏好的影响，容易从脑海中提取的信息就想当然地以为发生频率高，自己有直观感受的部分认为权重大。所以我们注意不要高估媒体经常报道的事情的频率，也不要高估自己对于团队的贡献，与人相处不要低估了别人做出的退让。

　　人类是损失厌恶的，因此换一个新环境会让人们觉得不安，不愿意走出舒适圈，人们纠结于可能损失的东西，然而说不定会产生更多的得到。知道人性的弱点就该努力调整自己的心态。

　　由于峰终效应，也许我们试图给别人留下一个好记忆时，应该着重营造中间一两次华丽的表现，以及结束时给别人留下好印象。

　　了解聚焦幻觉，我们就知道其实生活中的每一件事物都没有我们想象的那么重要，也不存在什么东西得到了就能从此收获快乐，即使有极值的快乐，也会随着时间的推移渐渐平缓。得到的越多，满足的阈值就越高，原来一支旺旺碎冰冰就能满足的快乐也许现在暴风雪都满足不了了……幸福在于自己体会，拥有感知幸福和感恩的能力是最重要的。

　　生活中有时候我们需要放慢思考；面对决策，也许集体讨论是很有必要的，每个人可以互相补足，防止一个人产生不理智的决定。为了减少后和可能发生的损失，我们在事前就应该仔细考虑，这件事如果失败了，它可能是由什么原因造成的，在开始行动之前我们就应该采用什么方法来防患于未然。

　　更全面地了解自己，也要在生活中学会应用。

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(七)：你猜Kahneman的老婆是谁？

　　声明：本文非标准书评，近似半学术吐槽贴。

　　从今年年初起就被那本Thinking fast and slow不定时刷屏，大概4月份的时候找了本英文电子版的翻了翻，不知道是由于排版问题还是怎么的，始终看不进去。几周前从图书馆借到了纸版，结果还是看了半本就还回去了，这本书的观点和例子都很有意思，科普性很强，但是我个人总是觉得过于琐碎，用过多的效应（effect）来解释各种决策中的非理性现象，描述过于细化，好像没有更加合理的框架整合，而书中谈到的两套系统（system 1&2）又过于普适，导致我一直在想这两个系统的证伪的例子，结果才疏学浅得没有想出来，所以至今对这本书的观点还是耿耿于怀。不是认为作者是错的，而是觉得作者描述了这么多的现象，也解释了为什么，可是到头来我却觉得作者什么都没有说。不过，因为我是生活在现在这个时代，人并非理性的观点已经深入人心，星星之火早已燎原了吧。倘使生活在上世纪七十年代，定会觉得作者不仅切中“理性人”假设的要害，更是吸引了大众的眼球呀。这也就不难理解为什么作者（Daniel Kahneman）的研究获得了2002年的诺贝尔经济学奖（补充知识：合作者Amos Tversky于1996年因某某黑色素瘤去世没得到诺奖，但是Kahneman在获奖感言上也说了军功章有Tversky一半）。

　　Y803这周的文献正好读到了Tversky & Kahneman1974年的science文章，加上老师讲了讲学术理论背景，我终于明白了自己困惑的地方，因此把笔记简单列出来，也和读过本书的大家分享一下。

　　有大概三个方向或者说理论层次来解释人类的判断和决策（Judgment and decision making），下面列出的是基本假设和观点：

　　(1) Normative Theories: Focus on how we OUGHT TO behave and how idealized rational and super intelligent people should make judgment and decisions, which should be always internally consistent. For example: game theory, probability theory and utility theory.

　　(2) Deｓｃｒｉｐｔive Theories: How judgment and decision ARE MADE.

　　(3) Preｓｃｒｉｐｔive Theories: What can real person do to make BETTER judgment and decisions.

　　由此可以回到我对本书的感受了，Kahneman & Tversky的研究主要针对于第二个层次，描述决策过程，尤其是找寻决策中的错觉（illusions），就像我们在感知觉中看到的各种错觉一样，它们存在并不是说我们的系统无可救药了，只是说我们的系统有时候会出错。就像Kahneman & Tversky在他们文章开头就提到的：“This article shows that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of asessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite usefu, bue someimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.” 实际上，Kahneman & Tversky研究中的例子和题设都不是随便从生活中抽出来的，他们试了各种组合，找到那个能引起我们决策错觉的那个作为最后的实验材料，例如他们某个实验的题目是这样的：“A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each day. As you know, about 50 percent of all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be hight than 50 percent, sometimes lower. For a period of 1 year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60 percent of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such days？ A. the larger hospital B. the smaller hospital C. About the same (that is, within 5 percent of each other)” 正确答案是A，但是实际上有53%的被试选了C（虽然我强烈怀疑真的有那么多人认为是一样的吗？这个就是题外话了）。如果我们把60%这个条件改成实际数字，人们的选择可能会改变或者使整体结果变好，但是正像之前说的，这是实验者精心设计出的，决策“错觉”，你就认栽吧！所以这样一解释，我自己也就不那么纠结于书中那么多效应解释那么多现象了，就像视错觉也是玲琅满目的，从错觉的名字都能看出来。

　　我们都知道之前的学术界倾向于研究第一个方向：理性的行为。因此，Kahneman & Tversky系统的揭示非理性决策的工作的确是异常重要的。现在我基本上不从目的上质疑了，不过第三个层次也回答了我之前的感觉。第三个层次应该是那些总问“so what”问题的人所向往的。但是目前，不论前两个层次如何，进入第三个层次——让我们觉得那些决策中的bug不再那么可怕——鲜有吧。

　　下面来介绍一位一直和Kahneman & Tversky对着干的吧：Gerd Gigerenzer，这位就是死活都支持rationality的吧，读文献前完全不了解情况，就看见作者单位是：Max Planck Institue for Psychology Research，感觉这个单位也是个神一样的存在吧，料想作者一定也不是什么无名小辈呀，查了下，再次证明我的孤陋寡闻和基础知识薄弱啊。这位光是科普书就写了好几本畅销的啊：simple heuristics that make us smart；calculated risks；Gut Feelings。一本没读过，但是后两本都听说过，最后一本更是看到之前友邻说“和Kahneman的观点完全反着，读着很费劲”。现在一下把所有之前零碎存储的记忆都连在一起了，就像周末要上映的《云图》的感觉似的。两者的争论除了之前提到的第一个层次和第二个层次外，还有对于Frequencist and Bayesian/personal Theory的争论。前者认为：“probability is a measure of relative frequencies of particulat event. Unless probability statement based on such proportion is meaningless, it should not be none.” 而后者则主张：“probablity judgment can be cased on any of one’s believed knowledge including knowlegde about frequencies or about a set of logivcal possibilities as well as other knowledge.” 其实看来看去我也不是非常明白，但是可见Gigerenzer主张前者，而Kahneman & Tversky支持后者。这个我也要再读读文献才有进一步的发言权呀。先不讨论了。

　　最后吐槽一下学术界吵架呀，这几篇文章读得非常逗就是因为两方在文章中露骨直白的打架简直太好玩了。比如，Kahneman & Tversky说：“this is a fact of life that targets of criticism should learn to expect, even if they do not enjoy it. in some exceptional cases, however, the fidelity of the presentation is so low that readers may be misled about the real issues under discussion. In oue view, Gigerenzer’s critique of the hueristics and biases preogram is one of these cases......” 个中乐趣还要各位自己去读文献体会了。

　　最后的最后：你猜Kahneman的老婆是谁？在Kahneman & Tversky的Science文章1126页右下角的这个段落开头谈到趋中回归时说“in the normal corse of life, one encounters many instances of regression towars the mean, in the comparison of the height of fathers and sons, of the intelligence of husband and wives, or of the performance of individuals on consevutive examinations.” 班里一个女同学特意提出抗议说为什么啊！凭什么啊！她其实只是想表达一下自己的愤怒。但其实八卦在于Tversky的老婆是谁，Kahneman的老婆又是谁啊！我也是今天第一次知道，孤陋寡闻啊：Tversky’s wife is Barbara Tversky and Kahneman’s wife is Anne Treisman. 但是我还没找到真正的槽点在哪里，到底谁高谁矮啊？

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(八)：Thinking twice, carefully

　　I haven’t made any thought on how to "label" this book yet.Daniel Kahneman’s book brings new explanation for human’s behavior, and the motivation behind it. Just like whatJim Holt wrote on NYTimes, this is the real "Two Brains Running", since "System 1 is impulsive and intuitive; System 2 is capable of reasoning, and it is cautious, but at least for some people it is also lazy".

　　It is a book related to psychology, economics, finance, philosophy, and most important, human behavior. This book reminds me that why the Department of Economics is just on the top floor of the Department of Psychology in CMU. Just like a hint, these two disciplines could bring some combination, and it does.

　　Thinking Fast: Not Bad It varies, however, it works for someone. "Thinking fast" shouldn’t be a mistake, or something else.

　　ome people just "compute" fast, and for most of us,we often compute much more than we want or need. Dr. Kahnemancalls this excess computation "the mental shotgun". In a little while, the collegues may complain that "you are thinking too much". Dr. Kahneman argues that random processes produce many sequences that convince people that the process is not random after all.

　　o the coincidence is not like the incidence we haven’t imagined before.“To the untrained eye,” Feller remarks, “randomness appears as regularity or tendency to cluster.”

　　It’s not a shame for people who think really fast, and "predict" things like wizard.

　　Thinking Slow: Think Twice The shortcoming for thinking fast is that luck is not always on your side. In another word, you can’t make your own chance everytime. So how about thinking it twice？

　　The professional basketball player is just a good example. For those top shooters,tv commentators may chant for the "hot hand". However,After analyzing of thousands of sequences of shots led to a disappointing conclusion: there is no such thing as a hot hand in professional basketball, either in shooting from the field or scoring from the foul line.

　　You may get the illusion for the latest two games, or five games. But trust me, as a fan of Kobe Bryant for two decades, I fully understand the ups and downs. One day the basket looks like an ocean, while in another day there’s a lid on the top.

　　The illusion is an anchoring effect. It occurs when people consider a particular value for an unknown quantity before estimating that quantity.

　　Dr. Kahneman explains that two different mechanisms produce anchoring effects—one for each system.

There is a form of anchoring that occurs in a deliberate process of adjustment, an operation of System 2. And there is anchoring that occurs by a priming effect, an automatic manifestation of System 1.

　　Read Brain: Loss Aversion

　　o how to read the brain？ It’s imperfact, not so precise as you could imagine. The first step is realizing the limitation.

A general limitation of the human mind is its imperfect ability to reconstruct past states of knowledge, or beliefs that have changed. Once you adopt a new view of the world (or of any part of it), you immediately lose much of your ability to recall what you used to believe before your mind changed.

　　The next step is getting ready to accept some facts. One fact,by Bent Flyvbjerg, is that in highly efficient markets educated guesses are no more accurate than blind guesses.

　　In a paper titled “Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth,” they showed that, on average, the most active traders had the poorest results, while the investors who traded the least earned the highest returns.

　　In another paper, titled “Boys Will Be Boys,” they showed that men acted on their useless ideas significantly more often than women, and that as a result women achieved better investment results than men.

　　Finally, for human beings, you just like winning and dislike losing—and you almost certainly dislike losing more than you like winning. It is shocking, but people have to admit IT’S TRUE!

　　In Economics, conventional indifference maps and Bernoulli’s representation of outcomes as states of wealth share a mistaken assumption: that your utility for a state of affairs depends only on that state and is not affected by your history.

　　How about loss？

The brains of humans and other animals contain a mechanism that is designed to give priority to bad news. By shaving a few hundredths of a second from the time needed to detect a predator, this circuit improves the animal’s odds of living long enough to reproduce.

　　Loss aversion refers to the relative strength of two motives: we are driven more strongly to avoid losses than to achieve gains. It’s a powerful conservative force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in the lives of both institutions and individuals. This conservatism helps keep us stable in our neighborhood, our marriage, and our job; it is the gravitational force that holds our life together near the reference point.

　　The benefit of loss aversion is that exaggerated optimism protects individuals and organizations from the paralyzing effects of loss aversion; loss aversion protects them from the follies of overconfident optimism.

　　《Thinking Fast and Slow》读后感(九)：认知与决策

　　Kahneman（以下称 K ）的《思考，快与慢》探讨了林林总总的实验，对主流经济学的 理性人假设提出了行为经济学和心理学方向的新观点。传统的理性人定义意味着，1、人具有关于他所处环境的完备信息，2、能对其稳定偏好进行排序，3、具有无懈可击的逻辑推理和计算能力。理性人作为经济学的基础假说，在此之上建立了一般均衡理论等丰硕的成果。但对此的质疑也并未中断。

　　从方法论来说，一种学科的假说并不需要与事实相符，模型的目的是简化我们的世界而使我们理解这个世界成为可能，——毕竟，我们有了最完全的模型：这个世界。但是我们无法理解。——而被接受的假说，常常是相对完整地贴合/反映世界又不过份复杂以至难以扩展。而 K 对效用理论的修正在这点上是必要的。【Richer and more realistic assumptions do not suffice to make a theory successful. Scientists use theories as a bag of working tools, and they will not take on the burden of a heavier bag unless the new tools are very useful.】

　　整本书的观点在书的正文末尾做了简要的总结，本文据此分三部分：心理学的 HUMANS 和经济学的 ECOS 的效用理论，直觉的系统 1 和分析的系统 2 的认知理论，体验的自我和记忆的自我的理论。

　　一、效用理论—— prospect theory

　　在经济学中，效用理论有着既是规定决策逻辑也是描述决策方式的双重身份。而 K 认为 费希纳（Fechner）效用是财富的对数函数（边际递减）的说法与和伯努力（Bernoulli）大多数人的风险规避说法都犯了错：The longevity of the theory is all the more remarkable because it is seriously flawed.

　　1、因为对于效用来说，reference points 显然是重要的。一个失去了400万与得到了400万的人，即使现在的财富都是500万，其感受（效用）必然是不同的。

　　2、相对于获得而言，同等的失去会造成更大的痛苦。

　　3、在获利与损失同时存在的赌博中，对损失的厌恶会使人做出风险规避的决策。

　　4、在一个确定无疑的损失和一个可能的更大损失（但不至于对生活方式产生威胁）之间（如：失去 900 元与 90% 的可能性失去1000元），对损失敏感性的递减将使人成为风险偏好的。

　　这四点也是 prospect theory 的基本结论。学术化的阐述见 ： http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/鍓嶆櫙鐞嗚��

　　K 的 prospect theory 解释了为什么价格上升影响比下降更大。而为什么对于穷人来说，禀赋效应（endowment effect，即对未拥有的商品的估价比拥有时要高）并不存在，由于在零点以下，小额的获得只是一种损失的减少。而穷人在获利和放弃之间并不是无差异的。他们所有的选择都在损失下进行：一种商品的购买以另一种商品的无法购买为结果。而在高尔夫里，没能打出小鸟球也只是失去的获利 (a foregone gain) 而非损失。

　　同时，K对 prospect theory 的缺点也直言不讳：它无法解释失望（ disappointment ）和后悔（ regret ）。

　　具体而言，K举了以下的例子：

　　What would it be like to own them？

　　A. one chance in a million to win $1 million

　　. 90% chance to win $12 and 10% chance to win nothing

　　C. 90% chance to win $1 million and 10% chance to win nothing

　　在这个例子里，Winning nothing is the reference point and its value is zero.然而这并不符合，Winning nothing is a nonevent in the first two cases, and assigning it a value of zero makes good sense. In contrast, failing to win in the third scenario is intensely disappointing.

　　rospect theory and utility theory also fail to allow for regret. The two theories share the assumption that available options in a choice are evaluated separately and independently, and that the option with the highest value is selected. This assumption is certainly wrong,

　　roblem 6: Choose between 90% chance to win $1 million OR $50 with certainty.

　　roblem 7: Choose between 90% chance to win $1 million OR $150,000 with certainty.

　　Failing to win is a disappointment in both, but the potential pain is compounded in problem 7 by knowing that if you choose the gamble and lose you will regret the “greedy” decision you made by spurning a sure gift of $150,000. In regret, the experience of an outcome depends on an option you could have adopted but did not.

　　二、认知系统

　　K 在书中区分了人认知世界时的机制，用系统 1 和系统 2 来描述。（K也指出，这种划分并不是生物学意义上的。）系统 1 对应直觉，用它思考是一种本能，它善于平均却不善于加总，特点是快；而系统 2 与有意识的注意力分配、选择相联系，它处理复杂的运算，特点是慢。

　　系统 2 根植于系统 1 ，这也意味着，我们的信念、选择、自主行动，实际上是系统 1 中的印象、直觉、意图、冲动和感受，被系统 2 有意识的接受（并以一系列步骤建构最终成为观点）的那一部分的反映。这也意味着，我们的认知并不是完美无缺的，它为系统性错误（systematic errors）的存在提供了空间。

　　系统 1 与系统 2 的区别主要在于所要求的努力程度。系统 2 需要意识的参与，而这一过程常常是相对费力的。ego depletion 的存在意味着，在完成一项任务转向另一项任务时，动力的衰退将会出现。正如作者所言：Laziness is built deep into our nature. You think with your body, not only with your brain.You know far less about yourself than you feel you do.

　　从这一生物学基础出发，K 详尽的列出了许多实验，读这些实验实际上是相当有趣的体验。包括但不限于：

　　1、曝光效应（ exposure effect ）

　　在熟悉与事实之间做出区分是困难的，因此频繁重复是使人对谎言信以为真的有效手段。更进一步说，对一句话某部分的熟悉可能会使人认为整句话是真实的。【People who were repeatedly exposed to the phrase “the body temperature of a chicken” were more likely to accept as true the statement that “the body temperature of a chicken is 144°” (or any other arbitrary number).】正确的结论常常诱导人们相信论证是正确的。【All roses are flowers. Some flowers fade quickly. Therefore some roses fade quickly.】

　　一方面，If it is strongly linked by logic or association to other beliefs or preferences you hold, or comes from a source you trust and like, you will feel a sense of cognitive ease. 然而，问题在于 there may be other causes for your feeling of ease—including the quality of the font and the appealing rhythm of the prose—and you have no simple way of tracing your feelings to their source.

　　认知放松，实际上是生物躲避危险的过程中产生的。同时，它也是心理和社会稳定的来源，由此构成了社会组织及凝聚力的基础。因此，它与一些好的感受相联系，如直觉、创造力、轻信、信赖。而这实际上会弱化系统 2 的警惕、怀疑、分析能力。

　　2、因果幻觉（illusion of causality）

　　在系统 1 的世界里，我们希望世界是一致的、常态的，一个事件必须有后果，而某一结果也必定有原因。然而，我们关于世界的信息是不完全的，而系统 1 的工作，就是把信息的碎片串接为一个因果的、一致的故事（story）。我们总是在寻求意义。

　　【Viewers see an aggressive large triangle bullying a smaller triangle, a terrified circle, the circle and the small triangle joining forces to defeat the bully; they also observe much interaction around a door and then an explosive finale. The perception of intention and emotion is irresistible; only people afflicted by autism do not experience it.Your mind is ready and even eager to identify agents, assign them personality traits and specific intentions, and view their actions as expressing individual propensities.】

　　【In The Black Swan, Taleb introduced the notion of a narrative fallacy to describe how flawed stories of the past shape our views of the world and our expectations for the future. Narrative fallacies arise inevitably from our continuous attempt to make sense of the world.

　　Taleb suggests that we humans constantly fool ourselves by constructing flimsy accounts of the past and believing they are true.

　　you feel that you have learned a valuable general lesson about what makes businesses succeed.

　　The ultimate test of an explanation is whether it would have made the event predictable in advance. No story of Google’s unlikely success will meet that test, because no story can include the myriad of events that would have caused a different outcome.

　　The fact that many of the important events that did occur involve choices further tempts you to exaggerate the role of skill and underestimate the part that luck played in the outcome.

　　You build the best possible story from the information available to you, and if it is a good story, you believe it.

　　Our comforting conviction that the world makes sense rests on a secure foundation: our almost unlimited ability to ignore our ignorance.】

　　【BBBGGG GGGGGG BGBBGB Are the sequences equally likely？

　　We are pattern seekers, believers in a coherent world, in which regularities (such as a sequence of six girls) appear not by accident but as a result of mechanical causality or of someone’s intention. We do not expect to see regularity produced by a random process, and when we detect what appears to be a rule, we quickly reject the idea that the process is truly random.】

　　【Analysis of thousands of sequences of shots led to a disappointing conclusion: there is no such thing as a hot hand in professional basketball, either in shooting from the field or scoring from the foul line.】

　　而因果假设同样可能是一种生物学上的进化优势，它使我们的祖先能尽量避免危险。

　　3、光环效应（halo effect）

　　【A very generous estimate of the correlation between the success of the firm and the quality of its CEO might be as high as .30, indicating 30% overlap.

　　Make no mistake: improving the odds of success from 1:1 to 3:2 is a very significant advantage, both at the racetrack and in business. From the perspective of most business writers, however, a CEO who has so little control over performance would not be particularly impressive even if her firm did well.

　　ecause of the halo effect, we get the causal relationship backward: we are prone to believe that the firm fails because its CEO is rigid, when the truth is that the CEO appears to be rigid because the firm is failing.】

　　4、过度自信（over-confidence）

　　http://wiki.mbalib.com/wiki/杩囧害鑷�淇＄悊璁�

　　【....participants who saw one-sided evidence were more confident of their judgments than those who saw both sides.....It is the consistency of the information that matters for a good story, not its completeness. Indeed, you will often find that knowing little makes it easier to fit everything you know into a coherent pattern......The confidence that individuals have in their beliefs depends mostly on the quality of the story they can tell about what they see, even if they see little.】

　　5、框架效应（Framing effects）

　　【Different ways of presenting the same information often evoke different emotions.】

　　【Our preferences are about framed problems, and our moral intuitions are about deｓｃｒｉｐｔions, not about substance.】

　　【Italy and France competed in the 2006 final of the World Cup. The next two sentences both describe the outcome: “Italy won.” “France lost.” Do those statements have the same meaning？】

　　6、锚定效应（Anchoring effect）

　　7、Availability bias

　　媒体影响信念：【Strokes cause almost twice as many deaths as all accidents combined, but 80% of respondents judged accidental death to be more likely. Tornadoes were seen as more frequent killers than asthma, although the latter cause 20 times more deaths. Death by lightning was judged less likely than death from botulism even though it is 52 times more frequent. Death by disease is 18 times as likely as accidental death, but the two were judged about equally likely. Death by accidents was judged to be more than 300 times more likely than death by diabetes, but the true ratio is 1:4. The lesson is clear: estimates of causes of death are warped by media coverage. The coverage is itself biased toward novelty and poignancy. The media do not just shape what the public is interested in, but also are shaped by it.】

　　我们头脑中的世界并不是真实世界的复制品，它是经过流行的和情绪的强度的信息所扭曲了的。

　　【The world in our heads is not a precise replica of reality; our expectations about the frequency of events are distorted by the prevalence and emotional intensity of the messages to which we are exposed.】

　　8、均值回归（ regression to the mean ）

　　【poor performance was typically followed by improvement and good performance by deterioration, without any help from either praise or punishment.....The more extreme the original score, the more regression we expect......When our attention is called to an event, associative memory will look for its cause—more precisely, activation will automatically spread to any cause that is already stored in memory. Causal explanations will be evoked when regression is detected, but they will be wrong because the truth is that regression to the mean has an explanation but does not have a cause.】

　　9、先知先觉（knew well before it happened）

　　【The core of the illusion is that we believe we understand the past, which implies that the future also should be knowable, but in fact we understand the past less than we believe we do. Know is not the only word that fosters this illusion.A general limitation of the human mind is its imperfect ability to reconstruct past states of knowledge, or beliefs that have changed. Once you adopt a new view of the world (or of any part of it), you immediately lose much of your ability to recall what you used to believe before your mind changed.】

　　10、“I-knew-it-all-along” effect, or hindsight bias

　　【Hindsight bias has pernicious effects on the evaluations of decision makers. It leads observers to assess the quality of a decision not by whether the process was sound but by whether its outcome was good or bad.....Because adherence to standard operating procedures is difficult to second-guess, decision makers who expect to have their decisions scrutinized with hindsight are driven to bureaucratic solutions—and to an extreme reluctance to take risks.We all have a need for the reassuring message that actions have appropriate consequences, and that success will reward wisdom and courage.】

　　11、The Illusion of Stock-Picking Skill

　　【What made one person buy and the other sell？ What did the sellers think they knew that the buyers did not？

　　The puzzle is why buyers and sellers alike think that the current price is wrong. What makes them believe they know more about what the price should be than the market does？

　　Odean compared the returns of the stock the investor had sold and the stock he had bought in its place, over the course of one year after the transaction. The results were unequivocally bad. On average, the shares that individual traders sold did better than those they bought, by a very substantial margin: 3.2 percentage points per year, above and beyond the significant costs of executing the two trades. It is important to remember that this is a statement about averages: some individuals did much better, others did much worse. However, it is clear that for the large majority of individual investors, taking a shower and doing nothing would have been a better policy than implementing the ideas that came to their minds.】

　　【The illusion of skill is not only an individual aberration; it is deeply ingrained in the culture of the industry.】

　　【Experts are led astray not by what they believe, but by how they think, says Tetlock. He uses the terminology from Isaiah Berlin’s essay on Tolstoy, “The Hedgehog and the Fox.” Hedgehogs “know one big thing” and have a theory about the world; they account for particular events within a coherent framework, bristle with impatience toward those who don’t see things their way, and are confident in their forecasts. They are also especially reluctant to admit error. For hedgehogs, a failed prediction is almost always “off only on timing” or “very nearly right.” They are opinionated and clear, which is exactly what television producers love to see on programs. Two hedgehogs on different sides of an issue, each attacking the idiotic ideas of the adversary, make for a good show.Foxes, by contrast, are complex thinkers. They don’t believe that one big thing drives the march of history.Instead the foxes recognize that reality emerges from the interactions of many different agents and forces, including blind luck, often producing large and unpredictable outcomes.

　　It is Not the Experts’ Fault—The World is Difficult

　　Meehl and other proponents of algorithms have argued strongly that it is unethical to rely on intuitive judgments for important decisions if an algorithm is available that will make fewer mistakes. Their rational argument is compelling, but it runs against a stubborn psychological reality: for most people, the cause of a mistake matters. The story of a child dying because an algorithm made a mistake is more poignant than the story of the same tragedy occurring as a result of human error, and the difference in emotional intensity is readily translated into a moral preference.】

　　【Statistical algorithms greatly outdo humans in noisy environments for two reasons: they are more likely than human judges to detect weakly valid cues and much more likely to maintain a modest level of accuracy by using such cues consistently.】

　　12、不作为

　　【people expect to have stronger emotional reactions (including regret) to an outcome that is produced by action than to the same outcome when it is produced by inaction.】

　　【Consumers who are reminded that they may feel regret as a result of their choices show an increased preference for conventional options, favoring brand names over generics. The behavior of the managers of financial funds as the year approaches its end also shows an effect of anticipated evaluation: they tend to clean up their portfolios of unconventional and otherwise questionable stocks.】

　　13、“Asian disease problem”:【 Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. A substantial majority of respondents choose program A: they prefer the certain option over the gamble. The outcomes of the programs are framed differently in a second version: If program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die. If program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die. Look closely and compare the two versions: the consequences of programs A and A’ are identical; so are the consequences of programs B and B’. In the second frame, however, a large majority of people choose the gamble. The different choices in the two frames fit prospect theory, in which choices between gambles and sure things are resolved differently, depending on whether the outcomes are good or bad.】

　　三、Well-being

　　【The emotional tail wags the rational dog.】

　　我们并不是完全的经济理性人，认知结构给我们带来了难以避免的“缺陷”。好与坏并不是能被界限分明的判断出来的。【Some distinctions between good and bad are hardwired into our biology. Infants enter the world ready to respond to pain as bad and to sweet (up to a point) as good. In many situations, however, the boundary between good and bad is a reference point that changes over time and depends on the immediate circumstances.】于是，“公平”、“正义”“风险”不能在客观的空中楼阁中去理解，它们必须被置于这个不确定的“真实”世界。某事件是否是公平的这个判断，常常被我对这件事有何感受的简单问题所替代。

　　【Consider this example: A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snowstorm, the store raises the price to $20. Please rate this action as: Completely Fair Acceptable Unfair Very Unfair The hardware store behaves appropriately according to the standard economic model: it responds to increased demand by raising its price. The participants in the survey did not agree: 82% rated the action Unfair or Very Unfair.】【The current worker has a right to retain his wage even if market conditions would allow the employer to impose a wage cut.The firm has its own entitlement, which is to retain its current profit. If it faces a threat of a loss, it is allowed to transfer the loss to others. A substantial majority of respondents believed that it is not unfair for a firm to reduce its workers’ wages when its profitability is falling.

　　They showed indignation only when a firm exploited its power to break informal contracts with workers or customers, and to impose a loss on others in order to increase its profit.】

　　这种利他性惩罚可能是社会的粘合剂。【altruistic punishment is accompanied by increased activity in the “pleasure centers” of the brain. It appears that maintaining the social order and the rules of fairness in this fashion is its own reward.】政策制定也可能过度，但是，从这点，民主也可能是最不坏的制度。【Democracy is inevitably messy, in part because the availability and affect heuristics that guide citizens’ beliefs and attitudes are inevitably biased, even if they generally point in the right direction.】

　　【Should the child exemption be larger for the rich than for the poor？ Your own intuitions are very likely the same as those of Schelling’s students: they found the idea of favoring the rich by a larger exemption completely unacceptable. Schelling then pointed out that the tax law is arbitrary. It assumes a childless family as the default case and reduces the tax by the amount of the exemption for each child. The tax law could of course be rewritten with another default case: a family with two children. In this formulation, families with fewer than the default number of children would pay a surcharge. Schelling now asked his students to report their view of another proposition: Should the childless poor pay as large a surcharge as the childless rich？ Here again you probably agree with the students’ reaction to this idea, which they rejected with as much vehemence as the first. But Schelling showed his class that they could not logically reject both proposals. Set the two formulations next to each other. The difference between the tax due by a childless family and by a family with two children is described as a reduction of tax in the first version and as an increase in the second. If in the first version you want the poor to receive the same (or greater) benefit as the rich for having children, then you must want the poor to pay at least the same penalty as the rich for being childless. We can recognize System 1 at work. It delivers an immediate response to any question about rich and poor: when in doubt, favor the poor. The surprising aspect of Schelling’s problem is that this apparently simple moral rule does not work reliably.】

　　【Case 1: A child suffered moderate burns when his pajamas caught fire as he was playing with matches. The firm that produced the pajamas had not made them adequately fire resistant. Case 2: The unscrupulous dealings of a bank caused another bank a loss of $10 million.

　　In single evaluation, the jurors awarded higher punitive damages to the defrauded bank than to the burned child, presumably because the size of the financial loss provided a high anchor. When the cases were considered together, however, sympathy for the individual victim prevailed over the anchoring effect and the jurors increased the award to the child to surpass the award to the bank.】

　　心理账户：

　　【A woman has bought two $80 tickets to the theater. When she arrives at the theater, she opens her wallet and discovers that the tickets are missing. Will she buy two more tickets to see the play？

　　A woman goes to the theater, intending to buy two tickets that cost $80 each. She arrives at the theater, opens her wallet, and discovers to her dismay that the $160 with which she was going to make the purchase is missing. She could use her credit card. Will she buy the tickets？

　　Most believe that the woman in the first story will go home without seeing the show if she has lost tickets, and most believe that she will charge tickets for the show if she has lost money. The explanation should already be familiar—this problem involves mental accounting and the sunk-cost fallacy. The different frames evoke different mental accounts, and the significance of the loss depends on the account to which it is posted. When tickets to a particular show are lost, it is natural to post them to the account associated with that play. The cost appears to have doubled and may now be more than the experience is worth. In contrast, a loss of cash is charged to a “general revenue” account—the theater patron is slightly poorer than she had thought she was, and the question she is likely to ask herself is whether the small reduction in her disposable wealth will change her decision about paying for tickets.

　　The version in which cash was lost leads to more reasonable decisions. It is a better frame because the loss, even if tickets were lost, is “sunk,” and sunk costs should be ignored. History is irrelevant and the only issue that matters is the set of options the theater patron has now, and their likely consequences. Whatever she lost, the relevant fact is that she is less wealthy than she was before she opened her wallet.】

　　【Tastes and decisions are shaped by memories, and the memories can be wrong.

　　A story is about significant events and memorable moments, not about time passing. Duration neglect is normal in a story, and the ending often defines its character.

　　Caring for people often takes the form of concern for the quality of their stories, not for their feelings.

　　Ed Diener and his team provided evidence that it is the remembering self that chooses vacations. They asked students to maintain daily diaries and record a daily evaluation of their experiences during spring break. The students also provided a global rating of the vacation when it had ended. Finally, they indicated whether or not they intended to repeat or not to repeat the vacation they had just had. Statistical analysis established that the intentions for future vacations were entirely determined by the final evaluation—even when that score did not accurately represent the quality of the experience that was described in the diaries.

　　A thought experiment about your next vacation will allow you to observe your attitude to your experiencing self. At the end of the vacation, all pictures and videos will be destroyed. Furthermore, you will swallow a potion that will wipe out all your memories of the vacation. How would this prospect affect your vacation plans？ How much would you be willing to pay for it, relative to a normally memorable vacation？

　　For another thought experiment, imagine you face a painful operation during which you will remain conscious. You are told you will scream in pain and beg the surgeon to stop. However, you are promised an amnesia-inducing drug that will completely wipe out any memory of the episode. How do you feel about such a prospect？ Here again, my informal observation is that most people are remarkably indifferent to the pains of their experiencing self. Some say they don’t care at all. Others share my feeling, which is that I feel pity for my suffering self but not more than I would feel for a stranger in pain. Odd as it may seem, I am my remembering self, and the experiencing self, who does my living, is like a stranger to me.

　　The frenetic picture taking of many tourists suggests that storing memories is often an important goal, which shapes both the plans for the vacation and the experience of it. The photographer does not view the scene as a moment to be savored but as a future memory to be designed. Pictures may be useful to the remembering self—though we rarely look at them for very long, or as often as we expected, or even at all—but picture taking is not necessarily the best way for the tourist’s experiencing self to enjoy a view.

　　Our emotional state is largely determined by what we attend to, and we are normally focused on our current activity and immediate environment. There are exceptions, where the quality of subjective experience is dominated by recurrent thoughts rather than by the events of the moment. When happily in love, we may feel joy even when caught in traffic, and if grieving, we may remain depressed when watching a funny movie. In normal circumstances, however, we draw pleasure and pain from what is happening at the moment, if we attend to it. To get pleasure from eating, for example, you must notice that you are doing it.

　　The focusing illusion (which Gilbert and Wilson call focalism) is a rich source of miswanting. In particular, it makes us prone to exaggerate the effect of significant purchases or changed circumstances on our future well-being.

　　The focusing illusion creates a bias in favor of goods and experiences that are initially exciting, even if they will eventually lose their appeal. Time is neglected, causing experiences that will retain their attention value in the long term to be appreciated less than they deserve to be.

　　The role of time has been a refrain in this part of the book. It is logical to describe the life of the experiencing self as a series of moments, each with a value. The value of an episode—I have called it a hedonimeter total—is simply the sum of the values of its moments. But this is not how the mind represents episodes. The remembering self, as I have described it, also tells stories and makes choices, and neither the stories nor the choices properly represent time. In storytelling mode, an episode is represented by a few critical moments, especially the beginning, the peak, and the end. Duration is neglected.】

　　【When we think of ourselves, we identify with System 2, the conscious, reasoning self that has beliefs, makes choices, and decides what to think about and what to do.

　　Intelligence is not only the ability to reason; it is also the ability to find relevant material in memory and to deploy attention when needed. Memory function is an attribute of System 1. However, everyone has the option of slowing down to conduct an active search of memory for all possibly relevant facts—just as they could slow down to check the intuitive answer in the bat-and-ball problem. The extent of deliberate checking and search is a characteristic of System 2, which varies among individuals.

　　tanovich’s concept of a rational person is similar to what I earlier labeled “engaged.” The core of his argument is that rationality should be distinguished from intelligence. In his view, superficial or “lazy” thinking is a flaw in the reflective mind, a failure of rationality. This is an attractive and thought-provoking idea.

　　Most of us think of ourselves as decent people who would rush to help in such a situation, and we expect other decent people to do the same. The point of the experiment, of course, was to show that this expectation is wrong. Even normal, decent people do not rush to help when they expect others to take on the unpleasantness of dealing with a seizure. And that means you, too.】

　　【“think like a trader,”

　　“treat it as one of many monetary decisions, which will sum together to produce a ‘portfolio.’”

　　Closely following daily fluctuations is a losing proposition, because the pain of the frequent small losses exceeds the pleasure of the equally frequent small gains.

　　A commitment not to change one’s position for several periods (the equivalent of “locking in” an investment) improves financial performance.

　　The outside view is a broad frame for thinking about plans. 】

　　【You have been exposed to a disease which if contracted leads to a quick and painless death within a week. The probability that you have the disease is 1/1,000. There is a vaccine that is effective only before any symptoms appear. What is the maximum you would be willing to pay for the vaccine？ Most people are willing to pay a significant but limited amount. Facing the possibility of death is unpleasant, but the risk is small and it seems unreasonable to ruin yourself to avoid it. Now consider a slight variation: Volunteers are needed for research on the above disease. All that is required is that you expose yourself to a 1/1,000 chance of contracting the disease. What is the minimum you would ask to be paid in order to volunteer for this program？ (You would not be allowed to purchase the vaccine.)

　　As you might expect, the fee that volunteers set is far higher than the price they were willing to pay for the vaccine.

　　a typical ratio is about 50:1. The extremely high selling price reflects two features of this problem. In the first place, you are not supposed to sell your health; the transaction is not considered legitimate and the reluctance to engage in it is expressed in a higher price. Perhaps most important, you will be responsible for the outcome if it is bad. You know that if you wake up one morning with symptoms indicating that you will soon be dead, you will feel more regret in the second case than in the first, because you could have rejected the idea of selling your health without even stopping to consider the price. You could have stayed with the default option and done nothing, and now this counterfactual will haunt you for the rest of your life.

　　The survey of parents’ reactions to a potentially hazardous insecticide mentioned earlier also included a question about the willingness to accept increased risk. The respondents were told to imagine that they used an insecticide where the risk of inhalation and child poisoning was 15 per 10,000 bottles. A less expensive insecticide was available, for which the risk rose from 15 to 16 per 10,000 bottles. The parents were asked for the discount that would induce them to switch to the less expensive (and less safe) product. More than two-thirds of the parents in the survey responded that they would not purchase the new product at any price! They were evidently revolted by the very idea of trading the safety of their child for money.

　　Even the most loving parents have finite resources of time and money to protect their child (the keeping-my-child-safe mental account has a limited budget), and it seems reasonable to deploy these resources in a way that puts them to best use. Money that could be saved by accepting a minute increase in the risk of harm from a pesticide could certainly be put to better use in reducing the child’s exposure to other harms, perhaps by purchasing a safer car seat or covers for electric sockets. The taboo tradeoff against accepting any increase in risk is not an efficient way to use the safety budget. In fact, the resistance may be motivated by a selfish fear of regret more than by a wish to optimize the child’s safety.】