《战争迷雾》经典观后感集
《战争迷雾》是一部由埃罗尔·莫里斯执导，Robert McNamara主演的一部纪录片 / 战争类型的电影，特精心从网络上整理的一些观众的观后感，希望对大家能有帮助。
《战争迷雾》观后感(一)：每位老人都是一本历史书，这是最精彩的一部之一
几十年的人生，亲身经历过的多多少少的大事/见闻。每位老人都能对过去的自己的一生有更多的时间去思考，总结。
而Robert McNamara的一生，确实是最精彩的人生之一。作为二战老兵，作为福特公司的首席策略顾问，和美国国防部长，加上最后退休后，作为世界银行的总裁，他所经历的一切的一切是我们常人所不能想像的。
顺便提醒一下，DVD的花絮里，附带了38分钟的访谈，也是一样的精彩，如果看DVDrip的，可能会错过这些。
《战争迷雾》观后感(二)：纪录片记录了什么？
很少会看纪录片，总觉得是无聊的陈述，也许是因为历史不好的缘故。这个片子打破了我这二十几年对纪录片的看法和认知。
片子讲述一位美国国防部长的主要人生经历，并他的人生经历给美国的历史也带来了不小的影响。不谈论是非曲直，也没办法客观的给予。
他的人生为我们总结出了11课，这个虽然涉及不到向他那样层面的，但对于我们人生对于企业管理有着很多的指导意义。
抛开片子给我们的粮食以外，对于战争，敌我双方，领袖和群众的思考维度，决策和人民利益到底是什么？？这个片子没有办法给我们答案。只是让看了这个片子，了解了部分历史的人，开始对于这个会有思考。当然只是个开始，没有终结的思考。
：现在百度和国内视频网站基本没什么好东西了，都被禁了。而很多网络媒体也和谐，只是放些无关痛痒愚民的东西。正所谓物质极大丰富的时候，想吃健康的反而要付出更多代价才行。这个还在土豆上有，大家可以看：http://www.tudou.com/programs/view/5tRI7hSuweY/
《战争迷雾》观后感(三)：十一個教訓
剛看完將米高摩亞的華氏911打低的紀錄片《the fog of war》。
其實是一套的訪問片，對像是麥拉拿馬。他是二次大戰期間，在美國空軍服役，參與過轟炸日本的任務；在古巴飛彈危機時擔任國防部長；更重要的是，作為當時的國防部長，他被認為是讓美國在越南泥足深陷的人。他將他在這些事件期間的經歷，重新說一次，總結了十一個教訓。
作為一個在近世重要戰爭的參與者，麥的口述甚為珍貴。幾個重要決定時刻他都清楚地描述出來。他對古巴飛彈危機的總結是：要同情（理解）敵人；理性不能救地球。他發現無論是他的總統甘迺迪、對手赫魯曉夫或是卡斯特羅，都其實理性得不得了。問題是情報的混亂，對對手的不理解，讓情況日漸混亂。至於越戰的升級，他將矛頭直指混亂的海軍情報及總統的倉促而剛愎的決定。
在描述的過程裏，他幾次提及戰爭的道德。他的報告影響了美軍空襲日本的策略，導致了至少一次在東京十萬平民的死亡；他國防部長任內有人使用橙劑這種惡名昭彰的化學品。他問：到底這些傷亡重要還是戰爭的勝利重要？他發現作為戰鬥人員，要是戰敗，無論出發點多好，都會變成戰犯；但他又不能無視這些損失。而到底長崎廣島的生命重要一點，還是可能出現在日本登陸戰的死傷重要一點？他似乎沒有答案，但他其中一個戰爭的教訓是：在做一件好事時，必須做一些壞事。
這片子是值得贏華氏九一一的。它的睿智和世故的論述方式，雖然觀眾是會對麥評論自己的說話會有所懷疑，但仍不失其當時人論當時事的風采。
《战争迷雾》观后感(四)：战争迷雾笔记
麦克纳马拉担任过福特汽车总裁、美国两届总统的国防部长、世界银行行长。他也是越战的主要决策与执行人。哈佛背景使他更善于从结果数据来分析原因与调整策略。他直言战争给平民的伤害，也承认自己的立场导致了大量平民的死亡。
纪录片总结了麦克纳马拉的十一条经验教训：
1.以同理心了解敌人
2.理性救不了人类
3.人不能只看自我
4.提升效率
在战争中的几个数字或一个小数点，都可能意味着巨大的伤亡与毁灭
在大型战争中，人命越发显得渺小。
5.战争应该遵守比例原则
为了良心还是利益去战争，结果只有输赢
6.取得资料
麦克纳马拉善长从结果看原因，分析数据，再进行调整和改善，从而来影响结果。
在汽车福特衰落期时担任非福特家族的总裁时，他研究福特的客户市场，推出经济型车，分析导致车祸原因，研发出安全带，更安全的方向盘。
7.信念和亲眼所见往往都是错的
想法导致行动，如果想法是错的，人只看到自己想看的，眼见不一定为实。
8.随时检讨自己的想法
9.为善有时必须作恶
战争是残酷的，所以用作恶和杀戮来证明吗？
10.世上无绝对之事
11.人性无法改变
他提出了“战争迷雾，战争太复杂，人类无法用自己的大脑来了解所有的变数，我们的判断力理解力都不足够，所以会杀死不该杀的人”
理性有极限。
“我们不能停止探索，
我们探索的最后会回到原点，
重新了解这个地方。”
对于战争的责任和罪恶感他不致一词。
《战争迷雾》观后感(五)：拨着大雾默默地在觅我的去路。。
不足之处：蛮偏心McNamara的，全片就他一人陈述观点，偶尔加插提问者的问题。单从他一人角度，未免有失客观。
客观性：导演应该花了很多心思，听了大量历史资料录音，才能根据McNamara的叙述拼凑出整段历史出来。但还是只佐证了他一人观点。特别 是，Mcamara说几张照片可以说明他与Johnson总统的态度差异，可这看图说话而且还是配上你自己说的话，能代表什么吗？？
故事结构：镜头、场景、序列、幕。
镜头：最明显是在一段叙述结束，都有一个地点画面，定格某人，然后虚化其他人，鬼影幢幢的表现效果。迷雾中死去的生命似乎出来控诉。
其余镜头除了对准McNamara的脸，就是一些史料镜头的剪接，不得不再赞一下导演的搜集资料的耐心和拼凑史实的能力。
场景：转场是简单的效果，白纸加上教训第几条，就清晰简单的将整部片切割成11段。好奇本片为何不叫“战争的11条教训”或者什么？
序列：最简单不过的按11条教训剪接。看得出是按照叙事者回忆的顺序开展下去的。但要做到如此，必须事前准备功夫很足，能引导受访者有条理地回忆起事实。（但估计条例和深度不够，没有一个大的贯穿全局的点，所以才蜻蜓点水式的11戒。）
幕：忘了是啥。
纪录片叙事：叙事视角、态度、方式和时间。
最大的视角就是：一切都可被原谅！听那国防部长说那过去的故事，无论成败，都似乎有份参与者为荣。把国防部长还原为人的同时，失去了批判的立场。
态度：我认为是偏向McNamara的。不过，有交代曾为福特的总裁，后又为世界银行总裁，似乎此人背景不简单。别以为人老就会说真言，也有可能想在呜呼之前美化自己形象。（虽然看着挺真诚的，希望是真的。）
hillip Glass配乐，正。
《战争迷雾》观后感(六)：“绝不说绝不”
“绝不说绝不”
y 千无千
我们这一代从未经历过战争，但战争迷雾这样的词汇在我们的生活中从不缺席，如今它会指在对战型游戏中电脑设定的不可见的区域，在游戏中会以黑色的雾气笼罩着游戏玩家从未探索过的地方，这样的设定也使得双方的游戏显得更为刺激，因为迷雾下意味着谁也不能明确对方的意图，或许在不经意间就会兵戎相见，也会因迷雾的消散而战局变幻。而这部获得奥斯卡奖的纪录片就是主角美国国防部部长麦克纳马拉要拨开这个迷雾再现他在战争中的选择。片中85岁的他穿梭在45岁的自己的身边去讲述自己所经历的故事，尽管45岁的他年富力强，从福特的总裁到美国国防部，从肯尼迪到詹森总统，他凭借着自己的非凡的睿智在战争中掌握着美军的命运。但85岁的他却谨慎地回答着画外音抛给他的问题，试图在时光逝去之后再反思自己曾经的所作所为。正如其在片子结尾时所引用的诗句“我们不要停止探索，在探索结束时我们将会回到开始的地方，并且第一次看清楚这个地方”，他带领我们回到他最初开始的地方
而岁月给麦克纳马拉带来的洞察力在片中被他归纳成了十一个忠告。每一个忠告都是对国家、外交、个人和理性之间张力的思考，对于外交政策的观察者的我们来说无疑是对外交政策分析理论的反思，当传统中会采用博弈论的理性分析模式去假设双方的行为者时，麦克纳马拉却告诉我们如果古巴导弹危机中赫鲁晓夫和里根通过理性来做出双方的决定，那么世界可能早已在世界核大战中被毁灭。片中他歇斯底里自问自答：“是什么阻止了战争，不，绝不是理性，是运气而已”。于是当我们在考虑理论分析的可行性和理性决策时需要考量理性之外的东西，因为无论是冷战中的苏美，越南战争中的越美决策者所想到的和他们所坚守的信念都有可能出现误判。正如杰维斯在其成名作《国际政治中的知觉与错误知觉》中所告诉我们的那样，决定我们选择的可能仅仅是我们知觉到的世界，而这个世界却可能同现实完全相反。因此要同85岁的麦克纳马拉一样去审慎地判断自己的决定和回答。越战是詹森的责任吗？你觉得你应该对越南战争负责吗？这样的问题放在麦克纳马拉依然是模棱两可的，因为历史从不喜好反事实的假设，麦克纳马拉认为在那个时间点那个变动的世界中他已经做了最好的选择。尽管反越战高潮期间他被称为是战争的罪魁祸首，独裁者，但如今从外交政策的角度来看，我们再也无法模拟曾经一模一样的决策情景，于是再对麦克纳马拉的所作所为进行政策合理性苛刻要求只能是事后诸葛，未免太强人所难。
其实在纪录片讨论决策问题之下隐藏了一个更为深刻的主题——战争与人性的反思，我想也正是由于这部纪录片试图通过亲历者的视角来让观众去深思这个主题，最终也成就了片子的奥斯卡最佳纪录片奖。字幕上出现了“为了成就好事就得行恶”，没有旁白，只是美军轰炸北越的场景，导弹在还原的场景中一颗颗落到村庄、田野，然后是浓烟冒起，飞机掠过。直到麦克纳马拉出现，略显落寞地承认了对北越使用了落叶剂，他不停地为自己辩解“从没有任何法律规定不能够使用这样的化学武器”，他想说自己没有错但始终有些底气不足，表示自己绝不会违反法律而下达某个军事命令。尽管纪录片的拍摄者竭力在片中不对麦克纳马拉的决定做出任何的评价，但是他试图要用法律的正当性却掩盖其战争决策中对人性的漠视却让观者觉得有些讽刺，我们的的确确无法在当时去苛责他的行为，但从85岁的他，从今天来看那的确是战争的恶，是再多的法律正当性都洗刷不了的。记得汉娜·阿伦特在其极权主义的起源一书中提到过“平庸的恶”，集中营的行刑者辩解说自己只是执行了上面的命令，一句无足轻重的话却已经将责任全部掩盖在了“上面的命令”几个字之下，他们认为自己不过是命令的执行者而已。这与麦克纳马拉的说辞有着多么相似的逻辑，阿伦特认为“平庸的恶”的泛滥才造成了当时纳粹的穷凶极恶，而麦克纳马拉再多的正当性也掩盖不掉战争下对人性施暴的恶。国际关系学者，媒体，公民社会组织，国际社会都在这样的层面上去讨论正义战争，战争冲突从人类诞生开始就从未在历史中消失，甚至如查尔斯·梯利这样的学者认为是战争才塑造了现代国家，但是这并不允许我们失掉战争中对人性底线的把握。这正像霍布斯在利维坦中所讲到的无政府状态，但“人与人相互为战”的无政府就意味这毫无规则秩序存在吗？很显然洛克，卢梭早已在其著作中给出了答案，也正因为此才有了社会契约论，才有了英国学派的国际社会理论。而看完本片，我不能再同意麦克纳马拉告诉我们的“战争是很复杂的，复杂得超出了人类理性所能够理解的范畴”，但是在这样的复杂性之下对于国际政治中的决策者抑或是整个人类不能漠视的是战争之下人性尊重这一条政治的金线。
《战争迷雾》观后感(七)：The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
The documentary
Realist or not？
Just by watching McNamara’s earlier life through the film and no matter what he said later as an old man who was emotionally talking about his past as the Secretary of Defense also as a husband who deeply loved his wife, he is a realist.
During World War II, it was McNamara that recommended the air force to bomb Japanese cities by using B-29, quickly weakening Japan for just one night. He has always been in accordance with General Curtis LeMay in this point. He repeated what LeMay said after a wingman died from attacking from 5,000 feet in resolute and decisive manner, “I sent him [the wingman] there. And I’ve been there, I know what it is. But, you lost one wingman, and we destroyed Tokyo.” (Morris 2003) As we learn from lesson 4 which is to maximize efficiency during the war. If one want to achieve something one must sacrifice some other things. Like McNamara said that killing is sometimes saving. In China, there is a adage which is “You cannot both get fish and a bear’s paw at the same time.” That means if you want to eat fish then you cannot eat other kind of meat dish. You can only choose one you like more. That’s totally realism. According to realism, survival is one of the three main principles. McNamara had chosen to survive so he only focused on defeating Japan as soon as possible.
And in Cuban Missile Crisis it was the same. During the phone calling part, when Kennedy asked what to do with Cuba, he immediately claimed that they should make a striking plan to get ready to invade Cuba. He thought that the Cuban nuclear weapon was a big treat to America, and for the security of his country he need to defense first.
Even though he made a mistake, when he talked about it he seemed not felt that guilty. So we are going into the most contradictory part, and here is when McNamara began to doubt about himself. Two destroyers of the United States reported that they had been attacked. Though no one was certain about the attacker, Johnson and McNamara did believe and assume it was done by Northern Vietnam as a test of their durability, which turned out later to be a mistake. As a response, McNamara formulated the bombing program “Rolling Thunder”. Even at that time when he talked about the mistake which was the blasting fuse of Vietnam War he still didn’t think that he should be sorry for that. He said “everyone makes mistakes” with his shoulder shrugging a little bit like it was something normal. Because at that time when he decided to hit back, all in his mind was that Vietnam was attacking United States and this was a danger to his country. He only wanted to face the reality and stop this kind of invasion. All he had to do was just to fight before things getting worse. It was all originated in the same perspective just as before, so why should he be sorry for that？ Until then, we still can assert that McNamara was a realist. But what makes us question about this assertion is coming.
In USA the Vietnam War can also be named as the McNamara War. But in the film, when 85-year-old McNamara was talking to 45-year-old McNamara, it seems that he was the backbone force in restricting the Military. And he highly praised in the Cuban Missile Crisis how President Kennedy focused on the main force of their enemy, making an agreement with the Soviet Union head Khrushchev as Tommy Thompson suggested, thus avoiding a devastating nuclear war. And McNamara still believes that if Kennedy had not been assassinated in 1963, the government of United States would in most cases withdraw troops from Vietnam in 1965, there wouldn’t be a 10 year long cruel Vietnam War.
It was like he would rather get rid of his noble position just for stopping the war. And in fact he did so. But what about the “killing for saving” before？
“In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil. ” This was from the Responsibility Theory in 1946 for introspecting about the World War II brought out by philosopher Reinhold Neibuhr. He thought that World War II was an American war of justice, even though they all violated the principle of not hitting the civilian. And American people must learn to accept this kind of moral idea. “We have certain ideals, certain responsibilities. Recognize that at times you will have to engage in evil—but minimize it.” (Morris 2003) And with the lesson 5 “Proportionality should be a guideline in war” McNamara at last concluded that if there had to be a war, it should be a war of justice just as what he thought of LeMay’s actions toward war were.
Justice is the relevant means of organizing social relations and their conflicting claims. The demands of justice exist paradoxically within the human heart. On the one hand, justice is imperfect. If humans pursue only justice then justice will inexorably fade out of existence and self-interest would take over. (Mark 231)
Even though McNamara was looking back to history just as Neibuhr
did, but all his experience pointed to the future, just to provide something
the young generations to refer to, to path way for the nuclear war in the future.
His educational background made him a rational analyst in data and strategy of war. His job made him a realist. Even though he admitted that the war brought too much misery for the civilians, he insisted that in a great measure it was because of the president. He said that the war was too complex for people to understand. And as for the responsibility and the guilty, he didn’t say a word. Because from the point of realism, he didn’t do anything wrong. His only fault was that he realized too late that the Vietnam War was meaningless. He resigned not because of the death number. If the Vietnam War would lead to a meaningful result, he wouldn’t resign no matter how many people would sacrifice.
If Secretary of Defense McNamara had been informed by Neo-liberalism, would it have been an effective way to avoid the need for his “eleven lessons”？ My answer would be “No.”
eo-liberalists believe that in order to counterbalance the fear that results from the anarchical international system, it is imperative that states peacefully coexist and create political, economic, and social ties to one another through treaties, alliances, and membership of international organizations and institutions.
“I’m not so naive or simplistic to believe we can eliminate war,” McNamara told Morris, “We’re not going to change human nature anytime soon.” But he was not at all realism, because he was not blind at all. He could see through what he was doing and at the same time analyzing if he was doing the right and useful thing. So as Kennedy thought that he was a pragmatist.
Realism can be problematic for pragmatists where realists fear pragmatism’s relativism, pragmatists fear realism’s authoritarianism. This combination of realism and pragmatism basically represented the Guiding Ideology of the Kennedy Government and the Military Doctrine of the Cold War. Just as McNamara said “I was in Cold War!”
In the book
As McNamara said, one of President Kennedy’s excellences was that he could introspect the logical reasoning and withdraw troops when it was necessary.
In the film we can see many times Domino were pushed down one by one on the map of Southeast Asia to indicate that the Kennedy Government determined to defeat the communist force of Vietnam then to pin down the whole East Asia by armed force in the early 60s. The Government took the independence of Vietnam for granted all for the leading position in Military force and thought spread strategy when facing the Communism during the Cold War. It wasn’t until that 58,000 American soldiers, causing an Anti-War wave that the Government started to think about withdrawing troops. I don’t think that the 30,000 Vietnam deaths were under the moral norms of the Government.
When McNamara talked about the bombing in Japan when assisting the General Curtis LeMay, being asked that if they should do this to Japanese civilian, the answer was a mater-of-course. Because if they hadn’t blown the willpower of Japanese Military thoroughly, it would have been the American soldiers that dying like Japanese.
In the book < The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara> by James G. Blight and Janet M. Langd, they provided a group of data which was in the 19th century , the rate of civilian death was 10%, in the World War II, it was 50% but 75% in 20th , called “McNamara’s Century”.
evertheless, all the wars in the world, no matter it was the 911 Event or the Gulf War, they all held the flags calling for freedom, for democracy. The Fog of War that McNamara said was that the modern war is becoming more and more complicated, more and more variable, and it was almost impossible for one not to make any mistake.
ut I think there is something deeper inside. And that’s why I don’t think the influence of Neo-realism would eliminate the need for his <11 lessons> because his way to survival made him to be responsible and loyal for what he was doing which was to win the war for the competing interests, which was the Elitism covered by the Justice.
The two most common approaches, idealism and realism, and their offspring, Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism, are illustrated by two former Harvard professors and leaders in U.S. government, Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara. For Kissinger, it’s not so much a question of universal moral principles; it is primarily a question of taking care of America’s national interests in a world compromised by human nature’s inherent pursuit of power.
If human nature is the problem, how to deal with it is the issue. The history of humanity’s attempts to do so does not give much cause for hope. We must admit that no method of taming human nature has yet been found. Albert Einstein famously said that it is easier to denature plutonium than to change human nature.
Just as what McNamara said at the end of the film, “There is a poem from T.S Eliot that I just love, ‘We shall not cease from exploring. And at the end of the exploration, we will return to where we started. And know the place for the first time. ’And that’s the sense where I’m beginning to be.”
What did he mean by return to where we started？ Human nature I think. No matter what kind of perspective we stand for. We are human beings, even animals.
From the New Testament comes a relevant question: “Do you know where your fights and arguments come from？” The answer in the Apostle James’s words: “They come from the selfish desires that war within you. You want things, but you do not have them. So you are ready to kill and are jealous of other people, but you still cannot get what you want. So you argue and fight.” (James 4:1–2, New Century Version).